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NOT AS BAD AS YOU THINK: 
WHY GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS MAKES SENSE 
Kermit Roosevelt III 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, Garcetti v. Ceballos1 introduced a new refinement to analy-
sis of government employee speech rights.  Prior to that decision, an 
employee’s claim that termination or other job-related sanction in-
fringed her First Amendment rights was governed by what was fre-
quently called the Connick-Pickering analysis.2  If the employee’s 
speech was on a matter of private concern, then it was unprotected.  
If it was on a matter of public concern—a category whose contours 
have remained vague3—it could be the basis for punishment only if 
the employer’s interest in governmental efficiency outweighed the 
individual’s interest in speech.4  Garcetti added a new threshold in-
quiry.  First Amendment protection attaches, the Court said, only 
when employees speak “as citizens,” and not when they speak “pur-
suant to their official duties.”5 
The reaction to Garcetti has generally been negative6—
unwarrantedly so, I believe.  In this Article, I will describe the deci-
 
  Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 2 The name comes from two Supreme Court decisions, Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 
U.S. 563, 568 (1968) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). 
 3 See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam) (acknowledging that 
“the boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined”); Paul M. Secunda, The 
(Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence:  The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to 
Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 101–02 (2006) (stat-
ing that Connick “provided little guidance as to how to draw the lines between what is ‘a 
matter of public concern’ and what is ‘a matter of private interest.’”). 
 4 How this balancing is to be conducted is also not clear, but it presumably means that em-
ployees may be disciplined for speech that poses a substantial threat of interfering with 
the operation of the government employer.  The Court has noted that employers’ predic-
tions about disruption deserve substantial deference.  See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 
661, 673 (1994) (“[W]e have given substantial weight to government employers’ reasona-
ble predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved is on a matter of public 
concern . . . .”). 
 5 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
 6 See, e.g., Sonya Bice, Tough Talk from the Supreme Court on Free Speech:  The Illusory Per Se Rule 
in Garcetti as Further Evidence of Connick’s Unworkable Employee/Citizen Speech Partition, 8 
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sion and how I believe it should be understood.  I will then consider 
several of the main objections to Garcetti and some important issues 
that it leaves unresolved.  Last, I will suggest a path for the Court to 
take going forward. 
I.  THE GARCETTI DECISION 
Richard Ceballos was a calendar deputy in the Los Angeles District 
Attorney’s office.7  In February 2000, a defense lawyer approached 
him to suggest that a warrant used against his client was obtained 
through a perjured affidavit.  Ceballos investigated this claim and ul-
timately agreed.  He conveyed his concerns to his superiors and me-
morialized them in a disposition memorandum recommending dis-
missal of the case.  His superiors called a meeting to discuss the 
affidavit, at which the discussion “allegedly became heated, with one 
lieutenant sharply criticizing Ceballos for his handling of the case.”8  
Ceballos’s superiors ultimately decided to go forward with the prose-
cution.  The defense moved to challenge the warrant, and Ceballos 
 
J.L. SOC’Y 45, 83–86 (2007) (“[T]he Garcetti majority is content to draw a line that will 
have the effect of shutting out some employees who expose government wrongdoing be-
fore any Pickering balancing analysis can be undertaken.”); Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed 
Speech:  When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 670, 683 (2008) 
(characterizing the Garcetti ruling as “an all-or-nothing approach”); Cynthia Estlund, Free 
Speech Rights that Work at Work:  From the First Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
1463, 1470–74 (2007) (criticizing the holding in Garcetti as “denigrat[ing] both the indi-
vidual and the public interests in favor of public employers’ interest in unfettered control 
over employees’ job performance”); Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship:  A 
Due Process Solution to a First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 144–53 (stating 
that “[t]ethering public employee speech rights to the ‘liberties the employee might have 
enjoyed as a private citizen’ seems to submerge the instrumental value of those rights”); 
Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing, and § 1983:  A Critique of 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 569–81 (2008) (asserting that the Garcetti 
opinion “is fundamentally inconsistent with the self-government rationale of the First 
Amendment”); Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government Em-
ployees, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2117, 2119 (“[T]he distinction between speech ‘as an employee’ 
and speech ‘as a citizen’ is ultimately not as useful.”); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public 
Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 1173, 1192–1202 (2007) (stating that “the preferable course of action would have been 
to retain the standard the lower courts had been following for decades, while perhaps re-
emphasizing the importance of the government’s interest in this particular context”); 
Paul M. Secunda, The Solomon Amendment, Expressive Associations, and Public Employment, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 1767, 1809–13 (2007) (proposing that a different analysis should be ap-
plied to public employee speech cases, where a court “determine[s] whether the constitu-
tional rights of the individual cannot be recognized without substantially disrupting the 
public employer’s enterprise”). 
 7 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413. 
 8 Id. at 414. 
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testified in the support of their motion, but the trial court rejected 
the challenge. 
Following these events, Ceballos claimed, his employers retaliated 
against him for the memo in various ways, including reassigning him 
and denying him a promotion.  He sued on the theory that this 
treatment violated his First Amendment rights.  After losing at the 
district court level, he prevailed on appeal.  The Ninth Circuit ap-
plied the Connick-Pickering analysis, finding that the content of the 
memo was on a matter of public concern and that there was no evi-
dence it had disrupted the operation of the district attorney’s office.9 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ninth Circuit.  Public 
employee speech doctrine, it observed, reflected two “overarching ob-
jectives.”10  First, it sought to allow the government employer to oper-
ate:  “[g]overnment employers, like private employers, need a signifi-
cant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions.”11  
Second, and in some tension with the first objective, it “recognized 
that a citizen who works for the government is nonetheless a citi-
zen.”12 
Fundamentally, these overarching objectives amount to an at-
tempt to promote two different kinds of equality simultaneously.  
First, the Court wants to promote equality between government and 
private employers with respect to control over the workplace and 
employee performance:  the government employer should have ma-
nagerial authority that at least resembles that of the private employer.  
Second, it wants to maintain equality between government employees 
and other citizens:  government employees should not be worse off in 
constitutional terms, i.e., they should not be required to surrender 
their First Amendment rights as a condition of public employment.13 
An obvious tension exists between these two kinds of equality, at 
least superficially.  (I will suggest that thinking more carefully about 
the scope of First Amendment rights can eliminate or at least reduce 
the tension.)14  If the government employer has the same power over 
at-will employees as the private employer, then public employees 
seem to have lost their First Amendment rights.  Conversely, if public 
employees have the same speech rights as ordinary citizens, the gov-
 
 9 Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1173–80 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 10 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 419. 
 13 For a valuable attempt to reformulate employee speech doctrine in terms of this equality, 
see Randy J. Kozel, Free Speech and Parity:  A Theory of Public Employee Rights, WM. & MARY L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
 14 See infra Part III. 
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ernment employer has drastically less managerial authority than the 
private employer. 
Since it is not possible to attain both kinds of equality simulta-
neously, the Connick-Pickering analysis attempts to set rules for when 
each kind should prevail.  The government employer cannot visit 
negative consequences on employees for speech on a matter of pub-
lic concern (i.e., public employees are equal to ordinary citizens) un-
less it has “an adequate justification for treating the employee diffe-
rently from any other member of the general public.”15  Such a 
justification will, or may, exist when the speech “affect[s] the entity’s 
operations,” especially if it affects operations in a way that a private 
citizen could not (such as disrupting the workplace).  Hence the gov-
ernment employer still has authority to protect the efficiency of its 
operations (i.e., government employers are similar to private employ-
ers). 
This analysis manages to carve out areas where one form of equal-
ity will prevail.  For speech not on a matter of public concern, there is 
no protection:  government employers are fully equal to private em-
ployers.  And for public concern speech that does not affect the em-
ployer’s operations, adverse treatment is prohibited:  public em-
ployees are equal to ordinary citizens.  But the margins of the realms 
of managerial authority and citizen speech are difficult to delimit.  In 
many cases, there is an unavoidable conflict,16 and it is unsurprising 
that in practice the attempt has ended up with an unclear balancing 
test. 
Garcetti, in the Supreme Court’s view, was an easier case.  The 
“controlling factor,” the Court said, was “that his expressions were 
made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.”17  This fact re-
moved his expression from the Connick-Pickering realm:  “when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the em-
ployees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, 
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from 
employer discipline.”18 
 
 15 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
 16 See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Costs of Agencies:  Waters v. Churchill and the First Amendment 
in the Administrative State, 106 YALE L. J. 1233, 1239–41 (1997) (discussing the differences 
between government and private employees).  In particular, there is no way to get around 
the fact that an employee who, speaking as a citizen, criticizes her superior, has to go 
back and work for that person.  How to deal with this is perhaps the hardest issue pre-
sented by public employee speech cases. 
 17 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
 18 Id. 
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II.  THE EASY CASE FOR GARCETTI 
The Court did not give an elaborate explanation for why speech 
produced pursuant to official duties should be unprotected.  It ges-
tured in two directions.  First, it suggested that speech produced pur-
suant to official duties was in some sense government speech.  The 
Court’s new rule, it said, “simply reflects the exercise of employer 
control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.”19  
Second, it suggested that this kind of speech should be conceptua-
lized as job performance rather than speech.  “When he went to work 
and performed the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a 
government employee.  The fact that his duties sometimes required 
him to speak or write does not mean his supervisors were prohibited 
from evaluating his performance.”20 
Both of these rationales have some superficial plausibility.  An in-
dividual speaking for the government cannot claim a First Amend-
ment right to say what he wants; when the government hires someone 
to speak for it, it can of course specify the content of that speech.  (A 
president’s speechwriter, for example, has no First Amendment right 
to write speeches criticizing presidential policies.)  And for the 
second, the reasoning is almost syllogistic.  The First Amendment 
should not prevent an employee from being fired for poor job per-
formance.  Sometimes, job performance will take the form of speech.  
Thus, when speech is job performance and it is bad, the First 
Amendment should not prevent termination on those grounds.  (Fir-
ing an employee whose reports are poorly reasoned or factually 
flawed should not raise a First Amendment issue.) 
Garcetti’s facts do not fit especially well with the government 
speech rationale.  Ceballos was presumably supposed to exercise in-
dependent judgment in writing his disposition memo, so the case did 
not present a situation in which a government employee, hired to say 
one thing, said something else instead.  But they do fit fairly well with 
the job performance one.  Ceballos analyzed the facts and law rele-
vant to the procurement of the warrant and believed that misconduct 
had occurred.  His superiors disagreed; they thought his memo was 
bad analysis.21  It would be odd if the First Amendment prevented 
 
 19 Id. at 422. 
 20 Id.  
 21 This, at least, is the impression one gets from the Supreme Court’s recounting of the 
facts. 
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government employers from favoring employees who gave them good 
memos and disfavoring those who gave them bad ones.22 
Nonetheless, academic reaction to Garcetti has been largely nega-
tive.  The decision has “made it nearly impossible for conscientious 
public servants to speak out in the best interests of the public without 
jeopardizing their careers,”23 writes Paul Secunda.  Sheldon Nahmod 
calls it “unsound as a matter of First Amendment policy because it 
under-protects public employee speech that is vital to self-
government.”24  Critics of Garcetti tend to raise five main objections.  
Speech pursuant to official duties may still be valuable from a First 
Amendment perspective, they say; it should not be excluded from the 
Amendment’s protection.  The line the decision draws between job-
performance and non-job-performance speech is unclear.  It creates 
an anomaly by forcing employees to take their complaints outside 
official channels if they wish to receive First Amendment protection.  
It may allow employers to exert broader control by defining em-
ployees’ duties broadly.  And it may threaten academic freedom, 
since teachers and professors speak pursuant to their duties. 
These are all reasonable concerns, warranting response.25  I will at-
tempt to address them in the third Part of this Article.  First, though, 
I want to consider the premise that underlies them all:  that allowing 
a government employer to discipline or terminate an employee for 
speech amounts to stripping that speech of First Amendment protec-
tion and thereby making the public employee worse off than the or-
dinary citizen. 
This premise seems to be generally taken for granted.  And in-
deed, there is a fairly straightforward way of framing the issue that 
generates it.  The government can take away the jobs of public em-
 
 22 Critics of Garcetti presumably do not want to prevent government employers from basing 
decisions on the quality of work; they only want to prevent retaliation for exposure of 
misconduct.  A whistleblower statute is a tool designed specifically to do that, and I think 
it is probably a better solution than the much broader First Amendment.  As a general 
matter, it seems obvious that judgments of the quality of work should be left to employ-
ers, even when the work takes the form of speech. 
 23 Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 
FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 117, 117 (2008). 
 24 Nahmod, supra note 6 at 563.  For more favorable assessments, see Elizabeth Dale, Em-
ployee Speech & Management Rights:  A Counterintuitive Reading of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175 (2008); Lawrence A. Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amend-
ment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2008). 
 25 Their proponents, of course, also owe a response to the worry that giving First Amend-
ment protection to official duty speech will prevent employers from favoring or disfavor-
ing employees based on the quality of their work when the work consists of nondisruptive 
speech about matters of public concern. 
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ployees, but not ordinary citizens, for things they say.  Thus, they have 
lesser First Amendment rights. 
But there is also a way of framing the issue that generates the op-
posite conclusion.  Government employees cannot be fined or 
thrown in jail for speech any more than a private citizen.  The gov-
ernment cannot use its coercive powers against them.  So how are 
their First Amendment rights lesser? 
Because they can lose their jobs for speech that their employer 
does not like, is the obvious response.  But so of course can private 
citizens.  An at-will private employee has no constitutional protec-
tions, not even the somewhat anemic Connick-Pickering balancing test, 
against dismissal for speech her employer dislikes.  If we compare 
public employees to private employees, rather than to private citizens, 
the public employees actually look better off in terms of protection 
for speech. 
Again, there is an obvious response:  that is simply a consequence 
of the state action requirement.  First Amendment rights run only 
against the government.  At this point, though, the obvious response 
starts to look a little like question-begging.  Yes, with minor excep-
tions, the Constitution protects individuals only against state action.26  
But why should it protect equally against state action in every form?  
Why should it be indifferent as to whether the state acts as a sove-
reign, making and enforcing laws, or as an employer, evaluating job 
performance?  In fact, it is not.  The Court has acknowledged that its 
employee speech jurisprudence gives the government greater latitude 
when acting as employer.27  Nor is this the only example:  the Su-
preme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine explicitly ex-
empts states’ non-sovereign activities from constitutional scrutiny 
through the “market participant exception.”28  So it is worth asking 
whether, why, and how the First Amendment should constrain the 
government acting as employer.29 
 
 26 The Thirteenth and Twenty-First Amendments, for example, contain constitutional re-
strictions that bind private parties. 
 27 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671–72 (1994) (“[T]he government as employer 
indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign.”).  It has not ex-
plained why, and that is one of the things I hope to accomplish in this Article. 
 28 For a description of the doctrine, see generally Barton B. Clark, Comment, Give ‘Em 
Enough Rope:  States, Subdivisions and the Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 615 (1993). 
 29 When the Supreme Court, in the mid-twentieth century, began to define the speech 
rights of public employees, it skipped this issue entirely.  The principle that government 
employees should not have to surrender First Amendment rights as a condition of public 
employment tells us nothing until we figure out what their First Amendment rights are, in 
the first place. 
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III.  WHY PROTECT AGAINST THE NONSOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT? 
A.  General Answers 
Why should individuals have constitutional rights against the gov-
ernment when it acts outside its sovereign capacity?  At a high level of 
generality, I find this a difficult question.  There is likely not a single 
answer that works for every constitutional right and every nonsove-
reign context.  In this Section I am going to focus on government 
employment and the First Amendment, since that is where I hope a 
theoretical investigation will produce a doctrinal payoff.30  (Analysis of 
Fourth Amendment rights in public schools, for instance, might look 
very different.)  Though a successful answer will have to focus on a 
specific right and a specific context, I will start by looking at some at-
tempts to provide an answer on a more general level. 
1.  The Constitution Says So 
The problem with this answer is that it is clearly false.  The Consti-
tution does not say that the rights it confers bind the government un-
iformly in every context.  The First Amendment, in fact, seems to say 
the opposite.  It specifies one branch of the federal government—
Congress—and one form of government action—the making of 
laws.31  There are textual justifications, the Due Process or Privileges 
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for imposing 
similar requirements on states.  And there are plain practical justifica-
tions for extending the ban on speech restrictions to the executive 
and the judiciary.  But it is simply not true to say that a government 
employer firing an employee falls within a prohibition on Congress 
making a law in any plain or straightforward way.  As far as the text of 
the Constitution goes, the natural reading suggests that termination 
of government employment should not raise any First Amendment 
issues.32 
 
 30 For a similar investigation, articulated in terms of the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine, see Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 
1028–35 (2005). 
 31 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
 32 This view is encapsulated in Justice Holmes’s famous observation that a police officer 
fired for speech “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no right to be 
a policeman.”  McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
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2.  The Government Is the Government 
Another potential answer comes not from the text of the Constitu-
tion but from the state action doctrine, which is a deep-rooted prin-
ciple of our constitutional law.  The Constitution does not protect us 
against private parties, this doctrine holds.  It does protect against the 
state, and why should it matter in what form state power is exer-
cised?33 
The state action doctrine is notorious for the puzzles it creates, 
and this Article is not the place to attempt to resolve them.  I will 
suggest, though, that trying to divide actors into conceptual catego-
ries of “state actors” and “private parties” is probably not the right way 
to go about the analysis.  If we want to decide the scope of constitu-
tional rights in unclear cases—that is, whether certain individuals can 
claim rights in certain situations and against certain actors—we will 
do better to ask what purpose those rights serve, and whether that 
purpose would be promoted by extending the rights to this set of cir-
cumstances.34 
I will try to do that in the following Section.  Here, I want only to 
point out that the fact that a government employer is, in some sense, 
“the government” does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it 
should be subject to the same constitutional constraints as the gov-
ernment acting in its sovereign capacity.  The state actor/private par-
ty distinction does correspond to some real differences that are rele-
vant to the scope of constitutional rights.  But with respect to many of 
them, the government as employer falls on the private party side of 
the line.  I will examine a few of these differences to demonstrate that 
point. 
One difference between the government and private actors is that 
the government is authorized to demand obedience to its lawful 
commands and back those demands with force.  It has a coercive 
power that private parties do not, and so it poses a greater threat to 
liberty.  The government can put you in jail, while private parties 
 
 33 See OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED:  FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE 
POWER 62 (1996) (suggesting that the employer/sovereign distinction provides no 
grounds for disparate powers). 
 34 This is essentially the methodology that interest analysis uses to determine the scope of 
rights in the field of conflict of laws.  I have suggested elsewhere that it can profitably be 
applied to decide the extraterritorial scope of constitutional rights.  See Kermit Roosevelt 
III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws:  Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2066 
(2005) (applying methodology to speech clause).  The issue of  government employment 
speech is essentially the same:  it is the question of what sorts of government action are 
constrained by the First Amendment. 
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cannot.  But of course the government as employer cannot put you in 
jail either.  It cannot do to you anything more than a private employ-
er could. 
Another difference between the government and private actors is 
that the reach of government is broader.  If some private party (an 
employer or school administrator, for instance) tries to impose rules I 
don’t like, I can decline to deal with him:  I can quit the job, or at-
tend a different school.  But I cannot escape the government’s rules 
in that way; I cannot opt out of state or federal laws.35  Here again, 
though, the non-sovereign government looks more like the private 
party.  Government employment is not inescapable in the way that 
laws and regulations are.36 
One might also suppose that there is a difference between the 
state and private actors in that the things the Constitution forbids are 
only bad when the government does them.  Put in formal terms, this 
is either a libertarian shibboleth or a restatement of the state action 
doctrine:  private parties may interfere with your enjoyment of rights, 
but only the government can violate them.37  In less formal terms, it 
has some appeal.  Invidious discrimination by the government is ana-
thema, but private discrimination (in, e.g., dinner party invitations or 
Boy Scout leadership) is tolerated, even constitutionally protected.38  
Still, the distinction has normative force in only limited contexts.  An 
unreasonable seizure by the government is bad and violates the 
Fourth Amendment.  But unreasonable seizures by private parties are 
also bad; we call them theft.  Our interests in life, liberty, and proper-
ty are protected against private parties by statutes, and no one thinks 
that private murder is less pernicious because it is not a due process 
violation.  This distinction turns out to mark a difference in only a 
limited set of cases; it is not successful as a general answer.39 
 
 35 I can, of course, move to a different state or even a different country.  But exiting the po-
litical community is a very costly way of avoiding regulation. 
 36 Public schooling is a different issue, since it is costly to opt out, and perhaps the inesca-
pability of government authority provides a better justification for constitutional rights 
against government educators than it does against government employers. 
 37 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17–18 (1883) (articulating this doctrine). 
 38 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (affirming Scouts’ right to ex-
clude gay scoutmasters). 
 39 In fact, it should probably make us look more closely at situations where constitutional 
restraints on government do not parallel statutory restraints on private parties.  Some-
times this will make sense; other times it will not.  In the First Amendment context, go-
vernmental interference with the marketplace of ideas is a core First Amendment viola-
tion, but the Amendment itself has been held to forbid state attempts to prevent private 
parties from distorting public debate, which is peculiar. 
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The most significant distinction between the government and pri-
vate parties is that the government is our creation and our agent.  We 
have an interest in controlling its behavior, no matter the form, that 
we don’t with private parties.  But this observation, though true and 
important, does not take us all the way to a conclusion.  It tells us why 
we might think that constitutional rights extend to nonsovereign 
government actions, but not whether they should.  To answer this 
second question, we need to think more about what particular consti-
tutional rights—here, the First Amendment—are for. 
B.  What the First Amendment Is for 
Speaking at a high level of generality, we can divide accounts of 
the First Amendment into two main categories.40  Speaker-centered 
theories suggest that the value and purpose of the speech right is its 
contribution to free expression as a means of individual human flou-
rishing.  Free expression is important to those who engage in it, on 
this account, and we protect it primarily to protect their interests. 
Listener-centered theories, by contrast, focus more on the inter-
ests of those who receive speech than those who create it.  Protecting 
speech is important, on this account, because receiving information 
is valuable.  Most centrally, listener-centered theories tend to suggest, 
a free flow of information is essential to allow the people to monitor 
their government and debate policy. 
The Supreme Court has never endorsed one theory to the exclu-
sion of the other.41  It tends to nod more towards the listener-
centered view, but while it sometimes says that political speech is at 
the core of First Amendment protection,42 it extends “full” protection 
 
 40 For a more elaborate discussion of these two models of the First Amendment, see Roose-
velt, supra note 16, at 1250–52. 
 41 Frequently, discussions will include both. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428–
29 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“This significant, albeit qualified, protection of public 
employees who irritate the government is understood to flow from the First Amendment, 
in part, because a government paycheck does nothing to eliminate the value to an indi-
vidual of speaking on public matters, and there is no good reason for categorically dis-
counting a speaker’s interest in commenting on a matter of public concern just because 
the government employs him.  Still, the First Amendment safeguard rests on something 
more, being the value to the public of receiving the opinions and information that a pub-
lic employee may disclose.”). 
 42 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (characterizing free speech as “the matrix, 
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom”); see also Carey v. 
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (characterizing speech about public affairs as resting on 
“highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (noting that “speech concerning public affairs is . . . the essence of 
self-government”). 
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to nonpolitical speech.43  Still, it is worth considering the theories 
separately in terms of their implications for appropriate protection of 
government employee speech. 
From the speaker-centered perspective, the rationale for prohibit-
ing employment decisions based on speech is not at all clear.  Yes, 
speech is a nice means of self-actualization, and yes, employees who 
cannot be fired for their speech are made better off by that rule.  But 
private sector employees get along well enough without it, and it 
seems a little bit strange that speech protection should be, in effect, a 
perk of government employment.  We do not seem to think that be-
ing fired for speech is such a terrible thing that it should never hap-
pen to anyone (if we did, we would presumably have statutory prohi-
bitions on analogous private conduct), and it is not obvious from the 
speaker-centered perspective why such a firing is any worse when 
done by the government.  It is not obvious, that is, why the govern-
ment, when it acts like a private employer, should not be treated like 
one.44 
In terms of the actual contours of First Amendment rights, then—
what we might call constitutional meaning45—it is not clear to me that 
the speaker-centered perspective gives us an argument for constitu-
tional protection of public employee speech at all.  A fortiori, Garcetti 
is correct from this perspective.  But it is worth remembering that we 
craft doctrinal rules to do things other than precisely track constitu-
tional meaning.46  There might well be a case to make that effective 
protection of other constitutional rights—freedom of religion, or ra-
cial equality, or prohibitions on partisan hiring for non-policymaking 
jobs—requires protection for limited kinds of speech.  There might 
even be an argument that the need to protect these limited kinds of 
 
 43 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (stating that “our cases have 
never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or 
ethical matters—to take a nonexhaustive list of labels—is not entitled to full First 
Amendment protection”). 
 44 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990) (noting that Congress “wished the 
Postal Service to be run more like a business” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  It is an interesting question, and one I have not resolved to my satisfac-
tion, whether it might be worthwhile distinguishing between the government as employer 
in the execution of its sovereign functions—e.g., as the employer of police officers and 
prosecutors (such as Ceballos)—and the government as employer in the execution of 
non-sovereign functions—e.g., as the employer of doctors and professors in state-run 
hospitals and schools. 
 45 See KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM:  MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS 22–36 (2006) (explaining the difference between doctrine and mean-
ing). 
 46 Id. 
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speech supports broader prophylactic protection for employee 
speech:  First Amendment freedoms, the Court has noted, “need 
breathing space.”47  All the same, the narrow Garcetti carveout for 
speech that constitutes job performance seems quite unobjectionable 
from this perspective. 
Things look somewhat different from the listener-centered pers-
pective.  Here, in deciding the scope of First Amendment rights the 
goal should be to protect the flow of information to the public, espe-
cially the information that is most valuable to self-governance:  argu-
ments about policy and information about the workings of govern-
ment.  From the speaker-centered perspective, I said, there is no 
obvious reason why the government as employer should be treated 
differently from a private employer:  the sovereign/non-sovereign 
distinction may be more important than the government/non-
government distinction.  But from the listener-centered perspective, 
there are reasons for treating the government employer differently 
from the private employer. 
First, there is the problem the Court has alluded to as “leveraging” 
of the employer-employee relationship.48  The concern here is that 
the employer will use his power over the employment relationship to 
regulate unrelated speech—that a state teacher, for instance, might 
be punished for writing a letter to the editor critical of the governor, 
even if the area of criticism has nothing to do with education.  When, 
as in my example, this leverage is deployed in favor of the govern-
ment (and perhaps even with the government’s knowledge and ap-
proval), the effect is to give the sovereign the ability to regulate 
speech in a way that it could not through the exercise of its sovereign 
powers. 
That is troubling, from the listener-centered perspective, because 
the sovereign is using its powers to skew public debate by suppressing 
criticism, and I think it is sensible to say that the First Amendment 
limits the government employer’s ability to do this.49  Still, it is not the 
 
 47 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
 48 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) (“The First Amendment limits the ability 
of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to restrict, incidentally or 
intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens.”). 
 49 Imposing this limit is basically what the Connick-Pickering test attempts to do:  if the speech 
is on a matter of public concern, it cannot provide a basis for dismissal unless it interferes 
with the employer’s operations.  The restriction of First Amendment protection to speech 
on matters of public concern is hard to explain as an interpretation of the Amendment’s 
meaning, and perhaps it is best understood as an underenforcing doctrinal rule.  The 
Court may have drawn the doctrinal line more narrowly than the best understanding of 
the First Amendment’s scope, that is, because it believed that abusive government action 
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most significant difference between the government and the private 
employer.  Indeed, much the same danger exists with private em-
ployers—one could imagine a corporation that fired its employees for 
speaking out against the political party with which it had allied itself, 
or which it had captured.  This is slightly different, because the cor-
porate employer is not a direct extension of the sovereign, but one 
can imagine connections close enough to be troubling.50 
The most significant difference between the government and the 
private employer is that government employees have superior infor-
mation about the workings of government.  Disclosing that informa-
tion to the public is part of the core of the listener-centered First 
Amendment:  it allows citizens to monitor and evaluate the perfor-
mance of the government.  (The role of the First Amendment, from 
this perspective, is to reduce agency costs.)51  Government employers 
who are not doing a good job have an obvious incentive to try to sup-
press such disclosure, and threatening adverse treatment of em-
ployees who speak out is a potent way of doing so.  The First 
Amendment should stop them. 
Of course, private employees also have superior information 
about the workings of their businesses, but protecting their disclo-
sures is not as important, for two reasons.  First, citizens who worry 
that a corporation is mismanaged, or acting contrary to their inter-
ests, or insufficiently transparent for them to know if either of those 
conditions obtains, don’t have to deal with it.  They can avoid its 
products as consumers; if they are shareholders, they can sell their 
shares.  Citizens cannot exit from their relationship with the govern-
ment in the same way.  Their tax dollars will go to support govern-
ment agencies no matter what they want.  Second, and relatedly, citi-
zens have no legitimate claim to control the behavior of private 
 
is much more likely and much more harmful (at least as far as leveraging is concerned) 
with respect to speech on matters of public concern.  Attempting to prevent speech-based 
sanctions for speech not on matters of public concern would probably incur costs that 
outweigh its benefits.  For a discussion of underenforcing doctrine, see generally Roose-
velt, supra note 45, at 25–26. 
 50 One response to this problem might be to say that the First Amendment should play 
some role in that context as well.  State laws allowing recovery for defamation of public 
figures without a showing of actual malice are unconstitutional because they produce a 
climate unacceptably hostile to speech.  See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
264 (1964) (holding that such laws are “constitutionally deficient” because they fail “to 
provide the safeguards of freedom of speech”).  We might say the same thing about state 
laws allowing corporations (at least, for-profit corporations) to fire employees for political 
speech.  With defamation, at least truth was a defense; with at-will employment, there is 
no defense at all. 
 51 See Roosevelt, supra note 16, at 1243–49 (framing the issue in terms of agency costs). 
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employers, except to the extent that they have rights as corporate 
shareholders.  The government, by contrast, is the agent of the 
people and should be responsive to their will.  It is supposed to be 
doing what we want, and reports from the front lines can tell us 
whether it is doing so or not. 
The consequence of this analysis is the following.  A look at the 
theoretical underpinnings of the First Amendment suggests that 
there is a good reason to treat the government employer differently 
from the private employer.  But it is a relatively narrow one.  Speech 
from employees to the general public, which will allow the public to 
monitor the government’s performance, is the speech we should be 
most concerned about protecting.52  There is a secondary concern 
about speech that is unrelated to the workplace, in that we do not 
want the sovereign government to be able to leverage the employ-
ment relationship in order to silence speech it disfavors.  In the next 
Section, I will use the perspective developed here to shed light on 
Garcetti and the problems that have emerged in its wake. 
IV.  GARCETTI AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
A.  How to Read the Decision; Where to Draw Lines 
What we make of Garcetti will obviously be affected by how we read 
it.  Justice Souter’s dissent, for instance, based several criticisms on 
the apparent view that Garcetti stands for the proposition that speech 
about the employee’s professional duties is unprotected.53  Garcetti ex-
plicitly disavows this interpretation, calling it “nondispositive” that 
Ceballos’s speech “concerned the subject matter of . . . [his] em-
ployment.”54  So what speech does Garcetti mean to place beyond the 
bounds of First Amendment protection?  As I have suggested already, 
 
 52 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the value of such speech.  See, e.g., Garcetti, 
547 U.S. at 419 (“Yet the First Amendment interests at stake extend beyond the individual 
speaker.”); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) 
(“Were . . . [public employees] not able to speak on [the operation of their employ-
ers] . . . , the community would be deprived of informed opinions on important public is-
sues.  The interest at stake is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion 
as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate it.” (citation omitted)); see also Waters v. 
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (“Government employees are often in the best posi-
tion to know what ails the agencies for which they work. . . .”). 
 53 Souter objected, for example, that “[t]he effect of the majority’s constitutional line be-
tween these two cases, then, is that a . . . schoolteacher is protected when complaining to 
the principal about hiring policy, but a school personnel officer would not be if he pro-
tested that the principal disapproved of hiring minority job applicants.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. 
at 430 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 54 Id. at 421. 
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I take Garcetti to stand for a relatively narrow principle:  employees 
may be evaluated and rewarded or punished based on their job per-
formance, even if that job performance takes the form of speech.  
The facts of the case fit well with this understanding:  certainly it was 
understood that Ceballos would be evaluated based on the quality of 
his memos.  And there are repeated statements to that effect in the 
opinion.  “Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to 
advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with a pending case,” 
the Court noted.55  He “wrote his disposition memo because that is 
part of what he, as a calendar deputy, was employed to do;”56 he “went 
to work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform;”57 he was 
“simply performing his or her job duties.”58  The case presents a ques-
tion of “First Amendment claims based on government employees’ 
work product.”59  In the end, the Court concluded, “[t]he fact that his 
duties sometimes required him to speak or write does not mean his 
supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance.”60 
The narrow reading of Garcetti, then, would take it to be removing 
First Amendment protection from speech that constitutes work 
product or job performance—speech that an employer could reason-
ably be expected to evaluate for its quality in a performance review.  
This seems like a manageable line to draw, and nothing in the facts 
or reasoning of Garcetti require us to push any farther. 
That said, the rationale does support a bit of an expansion of the 
unprotected category.  The basic idea seems to be that employers 
should not be prohibited from evaluating employees based on 
speech, when that speech is relevant to job performance.  Work 
product, like Ceballos’s memo, is the most obvious example of such 
speech.  But employees know, or should know, that they are eva-
luated based on many things other than work product.  A private law 
firm associate who writes impeccable briefs but is abrasive to the sup-
port staff might find himself in trouble at performance review time.  
An employee who uses an intra-office complaint system to file re-
peated and baseless grievances is not performing as well as one who 
does not.  So ultimately the conceptual line that Garcetti suggests is 
perhaps better characterized as the line between an individual speak-
 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 422. 
 58 Id. at 423. 
 59 Id. at 422. 
 60 Id. 
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ing as an employee, in the course of his job performance, and one 
who seeks to step outside the role of employee and speak as a citizen. 
The Court did use that formulation as well.61  And as a normative 
matter, thinking about the meaning of the First Amendment, it seems 
quite reasonable.  If First Amendment protection of public employee 
speech should be focused on protecting employees’ ability to inform 
the public about the workings of government, then speech they pro-
duce in their role as employee is peripheral.62  The problem is that 
this line is much harder to draw.  Lower courts have come up with a 
large number of factors to consider.  These include whether the em-
ployee was required to produce the speech, or paid for it; the subject 
matter; whether speech was made up the chain of command; whether 
it was made at the workplace; whether it purported to represent the 
views of the employer; whether it derived from special knowledge ac-
quired as an employee; and whether a non-employee could have en-
gaged in equivalent speech.63 
Some of these factors, like whether the speech was presented as 
representing the employer’s views, seem sensible.  Others, such as the 
subject matter, are largely irrelevant.  And treating the use of know-
ledge gained as an employee as an indicator of employee speech is 
probably counterproductive; it will tend to remove protection from 
the most valuable speech, i.e., employee speech that discloses other-
wise unknown information about the government’s workings.  As-
sessments of the performance of the federal circuits in drawing the 
lines suggested by Garcetti tend to be critical.64  What is clear is that 
the employer/citizen divide has proved to be anything but a bright 
line. 
The lack of a bright line raises familiar vagueness concerns.  As a 
general matter, a prohibition will be held unconstitutionally vague if 
its scope is sufficiently unclear that persons “of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”65  
The concern is especially acute in the First Amendment context, for 
 
 61 See, e.g., id. (“[Ceballos] did not speak as a citizen by writing a memo that addressed the 
proper disposition of a pending criminal case . . . . [He] acted as a government em-
ployee.”). 
 62 Some employees might have the job of communicating to the public, in which case their 
work product might serve that function.  But such an employee is probably best con-
ceived of as speaking for the government, in which case the government would be al-
lowed to dictate the content of the speech. 
 63 See Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2011) (listing these factors). 
 64 For a useful survey, see Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside the Lines:  Gar-
cetti v. Ceballos in the Federal Appellate Courts, 262 EDUC. L. REP. 357 (2011). 
 65 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
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when the boundary between the protected and the proscribed is un-
clear, speakers tend to err on the side of safety.  Self-censorship sup-
presses valuable speech.  Consequently, the Supreme Court has noted 
that with respect to speech, “the [vagueness] doctrine demands a 
greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.”66 
If federal judges cannot agree on the meaning and scope of the 
Garcetti rule, it pretty clearly lacks the specificity that the First 
Amendment requires of statutes.  That does not make it incorrect, 
much less unconstitutional, but it does suggest that it is not a good 
doctrinal choice.  Given the confusion in the circuits, Garcetti has 
turned out to be a bad thing in terms of First Amendment values.67  
The uncertainty it has created is likely to lead public employees to re-
frain from valuable speech. 
Two solutions suggest themselves.  First, the Court could limit 
Garcetti according to the narrow reading suggested above:  work 
product, on the basis of which an employee would normally expect to 
be evaluated for promotion or retention, is unprotected.  (It is hard 
to imagine not following Garcetti at least this far.  Whatever the Garcet-
ti critics want, they cannot intend to apply Connick-Pickering analysis to 
work product:  that would make it unconstitutional to promote the 
deputy who offers legally correct analysis over the one who errs.)  
Second, the Court could retain the broader understanding of Garcetti, 
under which all speech created in the role of employee is unpro-
tected, but balance out the chilling effect by creating a safe harbor 
for clearly identified citizen speech.  (This might be something like 
speech directed to the public or other private citizens, engaged in 
outside the workplace, and prefaced with a “speaking as an ordinary 
citizen” disclaimer.)  Such a safe harbor would allow the production 
of the speech that I have suggested is most valuable from the First 
Amendment perspective:  speech that informs the public about the 
workings of the government. 
Let us suppose that either of these solutions were adopted—or in 
other words, set aside the problem of vagueness that has developed.  
Is Garcetti still a bad decision, worthy of the criticism it has received?  I 
 
 66 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974). 
 67 There have been some examples of what I consider clear errors.  In Brammer-Hoelter v. 
Twin Peaks Charter Academy, for instance, the Tenth Circuit, after noting that not “all 
speech about the subject matter of an employee’s work [is] necessarily made pursuant to 
the employee’s official duties,” went on to hold that teachers’ discussions of student be-
havior and school curriculum—made during off-campus meetings not sponsored by the 
school—constituted expression pursuant to official duty because the teachers were “ex-
pected to regulate the behavior of their students” and “paid to execute the Academy’s 
curriculum.”  492 F.3d 1192, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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think not, and in the following Sections I will attempt to respond to 
the main objections its critics have made. 
B.  Objections 
1. Public Employee Speech Is Valuable 
A common complaint about Garcetti is that it strips First Amend-
ment protection from speech that is valuable, both to the speaker 
and to society.  For the former, as Justice Souter put it in dissent, “it 
stands to reason that a citizen may well place a very high value on a 
right to speak on the public issues he decides to make the subject of 
his work day after day.”68  And for the latter, the Court has recognized 
in a majority opinion that “[g]overnment employees are often in the 
best position to know what ails the agencies for which they work; pub-
lic debate may gain much from their informed opinions.”69 
But on closer inspection, neither of these concerns provides a 
strong basis to object to the principle underlying Garcetti.  Public em-
ployees probably do value the right to speak about their work, but 
Garcetti does not remove protection from speech about one’s job.  It 
removes protection from speech that constitutes one’s job.  Public em-
ployees may also derive satisfaction and self-actualization from their 
job performance, but that should not be a basis for prohibiting em-
ployers from evaluating that performance.  As noted earlier, if the on-
ly interest at stake is that of the individual employee—if we adopt a 
speaker-centered view of the First Amendment—the case for any First 
Amendment rights against the employer strikes me as weak.70 
What about the second concern, the contribution to public de-
bate?  That takes us to the listener-centered model of the First 
Amendment, and it identifies the speech I have said is most impor-
tant, the disclosure of information that helps the public monitor the 
government.  But again, this speech is not actually threatened by Gar-
cetti.  Garcetti does not reach speech to the public, unless producing 
such speech is the employee’s job (in which case the speech is actual-
ly the government’s speech).  The Garcetti exception is primarily 
about intragovernmental job performance speech:  speech from one 
 
 68 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 431 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 69 Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994). 
 70 See supra Section III.B. 
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state actor to another, undertaken to further the government’s pur-
poses.71 
This speech is of course valuable; that is why the government em-
ployer pays people to produce it.  But its value is not really a First 
Amendment value.  Job performance speech allows the government 
to function—it is the disposition memos of deputies like Ceballos, the 
internal memoranda of lawyers in the Department of Justice and 
elsewhere, the reports of subordinates in every agency.  It might also 
include reports to superiors about problems in the operations of gov-
ernment.  If these reports are accurate, they are a good thing for gov-
ernment efficiency.  But government efficiency is not a First Amend-
ment value.  In fact, it is the value that is usually opposed to First 
Amendment claims in the employee speech context.  The fact that 
Garcetti’s rule might reduce the efficiency of government operations 
is not an objection that sounds in the First Amendment. 
Nor, upon reflection, should it be especially plausible.  The case 
against Garcetti relies at least implicitly on a narrative about good em-
ployees who report real problems to their superiors and are punished 
for it, or good employees who refrain from reporting such problems 
out of fear of retaliation.72  If punishment were prohibited, the narra-
tive suggests, employees would be free to speak their minds and cor-
rective action would follow. 
One problem with this narrative as a source of the Garcetti critique 
is that it is not entirely clear that Garcetti, properly understood, ap-
plies to this speech.  Reporting problems in the government 
workplace is not, for most employees, the creation of work product, 
so it falls outside the narrow reading I have offered.  It is, however, 
generally speech undertaken in the role of employee, so it fits within 
the broader reading.  (The line between employee and citizen roles is 
hard to draw, but one useful question to ask is whether an ordinary 
citizen, in possession of the same information but not working for the 
 
 71 Characterizing the speech at issue as intragovernmental offers another straightforward 
argument for Garcetti.  Governments may in some circumstances have First Amendment 
rights.  See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
1637, 1638–40 (2006) (discussing the notion of granting constitutional protection for 
government speech and how courts have approached such a notion); Kermit Roosevelt, 
States as Speakers, 14 GOOD SOC’Y 62, 62–63 (2005) (considering the status of the govern-
ment’s First Amendment speech rights).  I could imagine states objecting to federal regu-
lation of their communication to citizens.  But the idea that the First Amendment regu-
lates communication within a single governmental entity is very odd. 
 72 Garcetti’s critics tend to imagine an employee whose speech is unwelcome, as Justice Ste-
vens put it in dissent, “because it reveals facts that the supervisor would rather not have 
anyone else discover.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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government, could have engaged in the same speech.  With respect 
to complaints to superiors, the answer will generally be no.)  But even 
if we suppose that Garcetti allows punishment for such speech, the 
Garcetti critique encounters another difficulty.  It is not at all clear 
that allowing punishment for such speech reduces efficiency, nor that 
First Amendment protection is a solution. 
This is not to say that retaliating against employees for bringing 
up inconvenient truths is not a bad thing.  Of course it is; no one 
thinks that employees reporting waste or misconduct should suffer 
for that.  But in response to the narrative about the good employee 
reporting real problems, there is a counter-narrative about the flaky 
or disgruntled employee who presents baseless or trumped-up com-
plaints.73  It would be difficult to determine which is in fact more 
common, and people’s estimates of relative frequency probably de-
pend on their priors.74  The question for us is who should sort the 
truth-teller from the troublemaker—or rather, whether the First 
Amendment requires that it be a judge and not the employer. 
The benefits of requiring judges to make the decision are not 
overwhelming.  Many government employers, after all, are interested 
in improving the operations of their agency and will do a good job of 
deciding which complaints are worth acting on, which should be ig-
nored, and which indicate problems with the employee raising them.  
If an employee brings concerns to a good employer, there is no need 
for judicial supervision. 
What about the bad employers?  There surely are some of them 
too, but the “good employee gets fired, but the First Amendment 
could fix it” narrative is not as convincing on inspection as it might 
seem.  First, firing a truth-telling employee seems like a very silly 
thing for a nefarious employer to do, since it increases the likelihood 
the employee will complain to the public or to higher-ups.  Perhaps 
adverse treatment short of termination is more likely, but even that 
increases the probability of broader complaint.  Second, protecting 
the employee from adverse treatment will not help much in terms of 
government efficiency.  The nefarious employer may be prevented 
from punishing the truth-telling employee, but he certainly won’t be 
 
 73 As applied to Garcetti itself, the “good employee” narrative describes a courageous deputy 
who uncovered misconduct and sought to remedy it, while the “bad employee” one shows 
us a misguided subordinate who reached an erroneous conclusion and refused to accept 
correction from his superiors. 
 74 See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 93–121 (2008) (considering the sources of 
judges’ ideologies, including education and experience). 
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induced to take action on the complaints.75  So First Amendment pro-
tection for this kind of speech seems likely to give few benefits, even 
in terms of government efficiency (which, I have said, is not a First 
Amendment value anyway). 
The costs, however, will clearly be very high.  Garcetti’s critics do 
not generally explain in detail what they would substitute for its rule.  
But it surely cannot be the Connick-Pickering test.  That would prevent 
employers from firing or reassigning employees whose memos ad-
dress issues of public concern and are nondisruptive, but are riddled 
with errors of legal analysis.  (Ceballos’s superiors, remember, con-
cluded that he was wrong, as, eventually, did the trial court.)76 
What is the alternative?  Justice Souter’s dissent offers examples of 
people he evidently feels should not face discipline:  a principal who 
makes a “fair but unfavorable comment” while reviewing a teacher’s 
performance, or deputy in Ceballos’s position whose judgment is 
“sound and appropriately expressed.”77  The implicit suggestion is 
that people who do a bad job—the principal whose evaluations are 
unfair, or the deputy whose judgment is unsound—may be fired, but 
the people who are doing a good job may not be.  This is a good 
principle of management, but it is a very strange application of the 
First Amendment.  The First Amendment generally does not allow 
the government to evaluate the quality of speech, so this would be 
quite a radical departure from the ordinary analysis—and a danger-
ous one, if not tightly confined.78  It would also make every employ-
ment decision about the quality of speech-based work product into a 
First Amendment case, which seems like a tremendous and unwar-
ranted increase in judicial workload.  And it would require the crea-
tion of constitutional standards for evaluating speech-based work 
products, which is something judges are not likely to be particularly 
good at—not as good, at any rate, as the superiors within a given 
workplace. 
 
 75 Speech to non-nefarious higher-ups might get results, but it need not be protected:  non-
nefarious higher-ups will not fire the truth-teller and can protect him from the nefarious 
superior.  Speech to the public might also produce remedies, and it should be protected 
because it fulfills the First Amendment purpose of informing the public about the work-
ing s of government. 
 76 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414–15. 
 77 Id. at 431–32 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 78 Bright lines do not only serve to notify individuals of whether their conduct is protected 
or not.  They also enhance doctrinal stability.  The idea that even “protected” speech can 
be punished if it is, in some undefined way, low quality could prove very dangerous to ex-
isting First Amendment freedoms if it spread beyond the context of public employee 
speech.  The watered-down First Amendment served up in one dish may find its way to 
another. 
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In sum, it is true that government employee job performance 
speech can be valuable.  But its value to the employee does not make 
a powerful case for First Amendment protection.  The Garcetti carve-
out is narrow, and it is an odd theory of the First Amendment that 
makes protection of this speech—effectively, a constitutionalization 
of speech-based performance reviews—a perk of government em-
ployment.  Nor does its value to the government employer suggest 
that First Amendment protection is appropriate:  the employer is 
much better than a judge at deciding whether particular speech is 
good job performance or not.  Last, while government employee 
speech can be very valuable to the public, Garcetti does not affect 
speech to the public. 
2.  It Is Anomalous to Drive Speech Outside the Chain of Command 
One consequence of Garcetti is that speech such as Ceballos’s 
memo is unprotected if offered to the employer as work product, but 
protected (at least by the Connick-Pickering test) if delivered to the 
public instead.  This strikes some as odd.  Justice Stevens, dissenting, 
objected that “it is senseless to let constitutional protection for exactly 
the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job description.  
Moreover, it seems perverse to fashion a new rule that provides em-
ployees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before talk-
ing frankly to their superiors.”79 
But further reflection suggests that these consequences are not so 
anomalous as they might seem.  A narrow reading of Garcetti would 
not actually reach an employee’s complaints to superiors, as long as 
delivering such complaints was not part of the employee’s job and an 
expected basis for evaluation.  The broader reading would include 
them within the unprotected category.  This makes some obvious 
sense:  complaints to superiors can certainly distinguish a good em-
ployee from a bad one.  (Valuable and accurate complaints are desir-
able; overblown, inaccurate or self-serving ones are not.)  So there 
are legitimate reasons that employers might want to reward or punish 
employees based on such speech.  The question is whether there are 
First Amendment reasons to prevent employers from taking this 
speech into account in personnel decisions. 
I do not think such reasons are particularly strong.  Speech to su-
periors, dealing with workplace issues, can be very valuable to the 
government employer.  But as argued in the preceding section, the 
 
 79 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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First Amendment is not intended to increase government efficiency.  
It is intended to facilitate public oversight of government, and that 
purpose is not served by intra-governmental speech.  The line be-
tween talking frankly to superiors and voicing concerns publicly 
marks a real distinction from the First Amendment perspective. 
Nor, in fact, are the efficiency concerns necessarily as weighty as 
they might seem.  Some critics have suggested that the Garcetti rule, 
by driving employees to address the public instead of superiors, 
“leads to a tremendous waste of judicial resources on unnecessary lit-
igation that might have been resolved internally.”80  It is imaginable 
that this waste will occur, but it requires a quite specific set of cir-
cumstances:  an employer who would not discipline an employee for 
speaking internally (and will even take corrective action) but will re-
taliate if the employee goes to the public, and an employee who is 
unable to accurately predict either response.  This should be a rela-
tively rare state of affairs, so Garcetti is unlikely to impose significant 
new costs on the judiciary. 
On the other hand, protecting such speech will impose significant 
costs.  If we use the Connick-Pickering test, employers bear the cost:  
they will simply be prohibited from evaluating employees on the basis 
of their complaints, as long as they are nondisruptive and address 
matters of public concern.  If we adopt a new one, to allow employers 
to disfavor employees who bring baseless or self-serving grievances, 
judges must develop and administer standards to determine when an 
employee’s complaints may be considered a negative in performance 
evaluation.  This task seems likely to be quite demanding, and also 
not one that judges are particularly good at—again, not nearly as 
good as employers.81 
3.  Employers Can Manipulate the Rule 
Another common concern raised by critics is that Garcetti’s rule, 
by stripping protection from speech produced in furtherance of offi-
cial duties, allows employers to extend their control over employee 
speech.  For the bad boss who wants to be able to fire employees for 
 
 80 Secunda, supra note 23, at 127. 
 81 An example is Vila v. Padrón, 484 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2007), where a college legal 
officer expressed concerns that various actions by the college were illegal.  That was her 
job, the court ruled, and hence her expressions were unprotected.  Id.  This is the sort of 
fact pattern that triggers anti-Garcetti intuitions—how can it be right to allow this woman 
to be fired for pointing out lawbreaking?  But further thought may dampen the response.  
Surely the college should be able to fire her for providing bad legal advice.  And do we 
really want courts deciding whether it was good or bad? 
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what they say, the trick seems simple:  just make everything they say 
part of their job description.  If you are worried about subordinates 
disclosing wrongdoing or waste, require everyone to make such re-
ports.82 
This possibility has been taken seriously enough, at least by a 
blogger, as to be offered as genuine advice for employers.83  But upon 
closer inspection it seems unlikely to be a serious threat to First 
Amendment values.  First, the Garcetti Court itself warned lower 
courts against allowing manipulation:  “We reject, however, the sug-
gestion that employers can restrict employees’ rights by creating ex-
cessively broad job descriptions.”84  Lower courts have proven them-
selves capable of detecting manipulative behavior or arguments.85 
Second, an artificially broad definition of duties should raise red 
flags for the bad boss’s superiors.  Unless they are in on it too—unless 
the rot goes all the way to the top, in which case no internal speech 
will be effective anyway—they are unlikely to approve what looks like 
a plain attempt to insulate the bad boss from oversight.  And last, this 
kind of behavior, even if it succeeded, would not affect speech to the 
public, which is the public employee speech that has the greatest First 
Amendment value.86 
Employers, whether public or private, should be receptive to em-
ployee disclosures of wrongdoing, as a matter of good management.  
And good management should be facilitated by grievance systems 
and whistleblower statutes, as indeed it is.  Those systems may not 
 
 82 As Justice Souter put it, “I am pessimistic enough to expect that one response to the 
Court’s holding will be moves by government employers to expand stated job descriptions 
to include more official duties and so exclude even some currently protectable speech 
from First Amendment purview.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 83 See Daniel A. Schwartz, First Amendment Claim Denied Where Employee’s Duties Included Raising 
Issues About Patient Safety, CONN. EMP. L. BLOG (Oct. 9, 2007), 
http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2007/10/articles/decisions-and-rulings/first-
amendment-claim-denied-where-employees-duties-included-raising-issues-about-patient-
safety/ (advising “employers that are considering revising an employee’s job [descrip-
tion] . . . to include a reference to reporting safety or other concerns”). 
 84 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25. 
 85 In Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705, 712 (7th Cir. 2009), for instance, the Seventh Circuit 
rejected an employer’s argument that state employees who wrote a letter protesting a no-
bid contract were fulfilling a broad statutory duty to report anticompetitive practices.  See 
also, e.g., Williams v. Riley, 392 Fed. Appx. 237, 241 n.2 (5th Cir. 2010) (“It is clear to us 
that Garcetti would not allow employers to create a formal policy, fire employees for fol-
lowing that policy, and then obtain protection from retaliation claims by asserting a quali-
fied immunity defense-claiming a First Amendment free fire zone.”). 
 86 The bad boss could, imaginably, charge all his subordinates with reporting wrongdoing to 
the public, hoping thereby to strip this speech of protection.  But even if courts were not 
able to see through the ruse, the end result would probably be an increase in public over-
sight sufficient to make it hard to fire truthful employees. 
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work as well as they should, and if they do not, they should be streng-
thened.  But layering the First Amendment on top of administrative 
and statutory schemes for protecting employees is a mistake.  The 
problem of superiors retaliating against subordinates who disclose 
their misconduct to other governmental actors is not really a First 
Amendment problem, and unsurprisingly, the First Amendment is 
not very good at solving it.87 
4.  What About Academia? 
The Garcetti Court explicitly reserved the question of whether its 
new rule could be applied in the academic context, noting that 
“[t]here is some argument that expression related to academic scho-
larship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional 
interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary 
employee-speech jurisprudence.”88  The Court was prudent not to de-
cide an issue not presented by the case before it, but the most natural 
conclusion is that the Garcetti rule should apply to teaching and scho-
larship.89  These kinds of speech fall within the narrow reading of 
Garcetti:  they are work product, on the basis of which an employee 
would expect to be evaluated.90  Deciding that teaching and scholar-
ship are protected by the First Amendment is less likely to improve 
the functioning of public schools and universities than to prevent 
them from functioning entirely. 
 
 87 Paul Secunda, after canvassing some of the other protections available to wrongfully ter-
minated employees, observes that employees who choose such routes still “are not receiv-
ing the First Amendment protection to which they are entitled.”  Secunda, supra note 23, 
at 133.  I certainly share the intuition that employees fired for disclosing misconduct are 
entitled to something.  (Secunda discusses Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 
2007), in which the court of appeals reversed a jury verdict in favor of police officers reta-
liated against for informing a district attorney that the chief of police had harbored a fe-
lon.)  I think they are entitled to a neutral decisionmaker’s assessment of whether the re-
taliatory action was justified.  But that describes an employment grievance procedure or 
arbitration, see Secunda, supra note 23, at 133–34, much better than it does the First 
Amendment.  In particular, the commonsense point that employers should be able to fire 
employees for doing a bad job is very hard to reconcile with the First Amendment’s gen-
eral refusal to consider the quality of speech. 
 88 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. 
 89 The Court may need to decide this issue relatively soon, as it seems to have engendered a 
circuit split.  Compare Adams v. Trustees of UNC Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 
2011) (holding that Garcetti does not apply to academia), with Renken v. Gregory, 541 
F.3d 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that it does apply); Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of 
East Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 2008) (same). 
 90 Educators may also speak as citizens.  There is a concern about government influence 
over their speech in that capacity—the fear of what the Court has called “leveraging.”  
But since the protection of this speech is not affected by Garcetti, I do not discuss it here. 
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The point, again, is that the academic environment is one in 
which assessments of quality are vitally important.  There may be no 
such thing as a false idea, as far as the First Amendment is con-
cerned,91 but in reality there is such a thing as a bad article or a sopo-
rific lecture, and schools cannot function if they are denied the abili-
ty to make that judgment.  The math teacher who decides to lecture 
on political science instead may be discussing matters of public con-
cern in a nondisruptive manner, but he is doing his job badly.  The 
teacher who stays on topic but offends students is also doing a bad 
job.  (Or perhaps not—perhaps she is shocking them into a higher 
state of consciousness.  But surely school officials, rather than judges, 
should make that call.)92  And the professor who produces tedious, 
tendentious, and unimaginative scholarship should not get tenure.93 
In one sense, it is hard to imagine what the people who suggest 
that Garcetti should not apply to the academic context have in mind.  
Tenure decisions simply cannot be performed according to Connick-
Pickering analysis.  In another sense, though, it is relatively easy.  They 
think that scholars should be free to explore controversial subjects, to 
criticize the government or other powerful figures, to follow their re-
search wherever it leads.  (The case for autonomy in teaching, rather 
than scholarship, is weaker, I think, and in the remainder of this sec-
tion I will focus on scholarship.)  That is true, just as it is true that 
employees who report wrongdoing should not face retaliation.94  But 
just as the First Amendment was not the solution to the bad boss out-
side the groves of academe, it is not the solution within them either. 
 
 91 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (“The First Amendment recog-
nizes no such thing as a ‘false’ idea.”). 
 92 Thus, I think cases such as Hardy v. Jefferson Community College, 260 F.3d 671, 682 (6th Cir. 
2001), in which an interpersonal communications teacher successfully invoked the First 
Amendment as protection against discipline for using derogatory language in class while 
discussing insults, are wrong.  School officials may be narrowminded and parochial; they 
may make bad decisions about how to educate.  But they are closer to experts in educa-
tion than judges are, and they are responsible to local communities in a way that judges 
are not.  There are certainly limits that the Constitution places on their control over 
schools; they cannot engage in religious indoctrination, for instance, or compel oaths of 
loyalty.  But absent some special circumstance, I find it hard to imagine that the Constitu-
tion prevents them from assessing teacher performance based on teaching. 
 93 In a rather astonishing decision, the Fourth Circuit held that a professor who had in-
cluded a book in his tenure file could then invoke the First Amendment against the uni-
versity when it denied him tenure in part because of reservations about its quality.  Adams 
v. Trustees of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 554–55, 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 94 Indeed, the case for protecting scholarship is stronger.  Scholarship, unlike most public 
employee speech work product, is generally directed to the public, or at least to nongo-
vernmental actors, which gives it a First Amendment value that intragovernmental speech 
lacks. 
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The ideal of independent and untrammeled scholarship is gener-
ally described as academic freedom.  This sort of individual academic 
freedom has never been clearly recognized as a First Amendment 
right.95  What protects academic freedom, in private universities as 
well as public ones, is the tenure system.  And while it is possible 
(though, I argued, inadvisable) to layer the First Amendment on top 
of whistleblower protection statutes and employee grievance rights, 
the choice with tenure is either-or.  The operation of the tenure sys-
tem in a public university, where state actors sit in judgment on the 
merit of an individual’s speech, is wholly incompatible with ordinary 
First Amendment analysis, or even the somewhat different Connick-
Pickering test.  Applying Garcetti to academia is actually necessary if pub-
lic universities are to have a tenure system. 
So scholarship should be deemed unprotected, at least as far as 
employment decisions by public universities are concerned.  This is 
not to say that a tenure denial could never raise First Amendment 
concerns.  Denying the math professor tenure because she criticized 
the governor in a letter to the editor would; that is leveraging.  And 
some degree of political partisanship in the assessment of academic 
merit would probably be unconstitutional, as if the only complaint 
about the economist were that his theories were contrary to the offi-
cial Republican Party line.  But in many fields, disentangling political 
elements from assessments of merit is quite hard.  University commit-
tees are probably better than judges at doing this, and tenure review, 
like partisan gerrymandering, might well be an area in which the lack 
of judicially administrable standards counsels underenforcement.96  
On the whole, I think the best way to conceive of scholarship from 
the First Amendment perspective is to think of it as akin to the fight-
ing words in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.97  It is generally unprotected, 
which is to say that universities are free to assess its quality and reward 
or punish employees on that basis, consistent with their own tenure 
 
 95 See Rosenthal, supra note 24 at 93–100 (discussing the “collide” between managerial pre-
rogative and academic freedom).  The Court has discussed academic freedom in the con-
text of a university’s right to judge the qualifications of its professors, Hishon v. King & 
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80 n.4 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring), and select its student body, 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003).  But this is a right of the school as a whole 
against outside regulation; it is not a right that individual professors may wield against the 
school. 
 96 See Veith v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (holding that political gerrymandering 
claims are no longer justiciable). 
 97 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  In that case, the Court struck down a ban on fighting words on the 
grounds that even though the broad category was unprotected, the ordinance at issue 
discriminated among unprotected speech in an impermissible way.  Id. at 381. 
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rules, but there are some criteria that cannot be used to evaluate it, 
such as avowedly partisan or religious ones. 
CONCLUSION 
Public employee speech can indeed be very valuable.  But its value 
is not always a First Amendment value, and the First Amendment is 
not always its best means of protection.  The speech reached by even 
a broad reading of Garcetti is likely to be of low First Amendment val-
ue; it is likely to be intragovernmental speech rather than speech that 
allows the public to monitor government.  And trying to protect it by 
means of the First Amendment presents some formidable problems.  
Generally speaking, our First Amendment doctrine is good at making 
the government keep its hands off.  It is not good at supervising 
nuanced and context-sensitive judgments about the quality of speech 
or its social appropriateness; indeed, the Court’s decisions repeatedly 
proclaim that the Amendment does not allow the government to 
make such judgments.98  But the government cannot be hands-off 
with its employees and agnostic as to the quality of their work prod-
uct:  employers must be able to evaluate employee job performance.  
Garcetti’s carveout is sensible in terms of both First Amendment values 
and managerial efficiency. 
This is not to say that all is well in the world of employee speech 
rights.  The line that Garcetti suggests has proven hard to draw.  
Courts are making mistakes, and even if they do not, dim lines chill 
speech.  The problem could be mitigated by restricting Garcetti to 
plain examples of work product, on which employees would reasona-
bly expect to be evaluated.  Or, the solution I prefer, the problem of 
the blurry line between speech as a citizen and speech as an em-
ployee could be solved by creating a safe harbor for employees who 
want to speak as citizens.  Such a safe harbor could require that the 
employees speak to the public, do so outside the workplace, and 
make clear that they are not speaking for their employer.  Speech in 
this safe harbor would, ideally, be protected not by the anemic Con-
nick-Pickering balancing test but by something closer to the ordinary 
First Amendment analysis, with carveouts for speech that either de-
monstrably disrupts working relationships or suggests an unfitness for 
the job.99  This would be a space where we could approach true parity 
 
 98 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (“[N]o such thing as a 
‘false’ idea.”); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“[On]e man’s vulgarity is 
another’s lyric.”).  
 99 See Roosevelt, supra note 16 (describing safe harbor). 
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between government employees and ordinary citizens.100  This ap-
proach would use the First Amendment to protect speech that has 
First Amendment value.  It would leave protection of other speech to 
devices that are tailored to the needs of the different circumstances 
in which it occurs. 
 
100 Thus I endorse fundamentally the same baseline norm as Kozel, supra note 13.  I differ, I 
think, in that I believe that full parity requires some narrowing of the occasions for 
speech. 
